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THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF AMERICAN PORT ACTIVITIES
Richard A. Lidinsky, Jr.*
Deborah A. Colson**
I. INTRODUCTION
A crucial but often overlooked party in the transaction of international
trade is the port. While American ports have much in common with their
counterparts throughout the world, federal laws and regulations place U.S.
ports in a unique posture. Unlike Canadian, Japanese, and European ports
that are both owned and operated by thier respective governments, American
ports are merely regulated by the federal government. Specifically, there are
over 2,400 port facilities throughout the United States that are owned by
either state, local, or private entities. Federal laws and regulations control
the operation of these ports, the activities of their serving vessels, and their
competitive nature.
The primary focus of this article is on the Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC),I which is the regulatory body charged with the supervision of
*Richard A. Lidinsky, Jr. is the Director of Tariffs and National Port Affairs for
the Maryland Port Administration; B.A., American University School of Government
and Public Affairs, 1968; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 1972; member of
the Maryland and District of Columbia Bar Associations; former Legislative Counsel,
Federal Maritime Commission.
**Deborah A. Colson, Law Clerk, Maryland Port Administration; B.A., University
of Pennsylvania, 1978; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 1981. The views
expressed in this article are entirely personal and do not express the official policy of
any agency of the State of Maryland.
1. H. MARCUS, T. SHORT, J. KYPERS FEDERAL PORT POLICY, (Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, 1976), [hereinafter Marcus], describes the functioning of the FMC
at 58-59.
The Federal Maritime Commission was established by Reorganization Plan 7,
effective August 12, 1961, as an independent agency to administer the regulatory
responsibilities outlined under the Shipping Act of 1916, the Merchant Marine
Act of 1920, the Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933, and the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936. These laws give the FMC jurisdiction over waterborne movements be-
tween the United States and foreign countries as well as to noncontiguous ports of
the United States. Additionally, the Commission administers certain provisions of
the Water Quality Improvement Act (WQIA) of 1970.
Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 728, Codified at 46 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 988, Codified at 46 U.S.C. § 861 et seq. Intercoastal Ship-
ping Act of 1933, 47 Stat. 1425, Codified at 46 U.S.C. § 843 et seq. and the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1985, Codified at 46 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. In this article,
since the Shipping Act of 1916 is the primary source of maritime law, it will be referred
to as "the Act."
FEDERAL REGULATION OF AMERICAN PORT ACTIVITIES
'
tcommon carriers"2 in foreign commerce and of "other persons"3 subject to the
various shipping acts. The regulatory powers of the FMC are widespread. For
example, if a port handles cargo, or provides the facilities for the handling of
cargo, a tariff schedule must be filed with the FMC.' If a port is
contemplating the creation or expansion of a terminal or cargo-handling
area, the FMC can exercise jurisdiction over the possible environmental
impact of such an action.' If a port displays favoritism to a shipper or ocean
carrier through terminal-regulated rates or lease agreements, the FMC can
investigate such activities and impose civil fines upon the port.' Thus, the
role of the FMC during what has been labelled as an era of deregulation has
essentially been one of re-regulation. New responsibilities have continued to
be placed upon the Commission by Congress. The result is that there has
been only a minimal decrease in the regulation of ports.7
In addition to the FMC, there are other areas of federal activity that
directly or indirectly regulate American ports. Specifically, various other
federal agencies such as the Coast Guard,8 the Maritime Administration,9 the
Interstate Commerce Commission," the Department of Transportation," and
the Environmental Protection Agency. 2 The role of each of these agencies in
Prior to the establishment of the Federal Maritime Commission, the shipping
industry was regulated by the U.S. Shipping Board (1919-33); the U.S. Shipping
Board, Department of Commerce (1933-36); the U.S. Maritime Commission (1936-50);
and the Federal Maritime Board (1950-61).
2. See 46 U.S.C. § 801. The term "common carrier by water in foreign commerce"
means a common carrier, except ferry boats running on regular rates, engaged in the
transportation by water of passengers or property between the United States or any of
its Districts, Territories, or possessions and a foreign country, whether in the import or
export trade: Provided, that a cargo boat commonly called ocean-tramp shall not be
deemed such "common carrier by water in foreign commerce."
3. The term "other person" means any person not included in the term "common
carrier by water," carrying on the business of forwarding or furnishing wharfage, dock,
warehouse, or other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by water.
4. See 46 U.S.C. § 817.
5. FMC General Order 45, 46 CFR Part 547, May 21, 1980.
6. See 46 U.S.C. § 831.
7. The 96th Congress enacted major deregulation measures in the area of rail
(P.L. 96-448) and motor carriers (P.L. 96-296) activity; interestingly, the major leg-
islative proposals dealing with ocean carriers and ports (H.R. 4769 and S. 2535), enti-
tled Omnibus Bills, consolidated and somewhat increased existing FMC powers over
them, rather than deregulating them.
8. January 28, 1915, Ch. 20, Sec. 1; 38 Stat. 800.
9. Merchant Marine Act of 1936; Act of June 29, 1936, Ch. 858; 49 Stat. 1985; 46
U.S.C. § 1101 (1958).
10. 24 Stat. 379, 383; 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-22.
11. 80 Stat. 931; 49 U.S.C. § 1651.
12. Public Law 91-190; 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; 83 Stat. 852, January 1, 1970.
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the regulation of U.S. ports will be discussed in this article. However, in
order to understand the general scope of federal regulation of port activity,
FMC jurisdiction over vessels that call on regulated ports must first be
examined.
II. THE FMC AND PORTS
A. THE SHIPPING ACT OF 1916
The crux of federal regulation of ports is contained in Section 1 of the
Shipping Act of 1916.'1 This section affects "any person not included in the
term common carrier by water, carrying on the business of forwarding or
furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse or other terminal facilities in connec-
tion with a common carrier by water."'4
In 1944 the Supreme Court rendered a decision that specifically
interpreted the meaning of the phrase "other person" as employed by the
Act.'5 According to the Court, the circumstances that gave rise to the
enactment of the Shipping Act must be given primary consideration in
determining what "other person" is subject to the Act's jurisdiction.'6 The
Court ultimately determined that municipalities are included in the term
"other person" since they are the public owners of wharves and piers that
furnish the sort of facilities ordinarily subject to the jurisdiction of the Act.'
As the Court noted, to exempt such facilities from the jurisdiction of the
Shipping Act "would have defeated the very purpose for which Congress
framed the scheme for regulating waterfront terminals . . . there can be no
doubt that wharf storage facilities provided at shipside for cargo which has
been unloaded from water carriers are subject to regulation by the
Commission. '"8 FMC jurisdiction attaches to those facilities that create "links
13. 39 Stat. 728$Chapter 451, September 7, 1916. (Shipping Act repealed by
Transportation Act of 1940.)
14. The regulations define dockage as "the charge assessed against a vessel for
berthing at a wharf, pier, bulkhead structure, or bank, or for mooring to a vessel so
berthed." 46 CFR § 533.6 (d)(1). Wharfage is defined as a "charge assessed against the
cargo or vessel on all cargo passing or conveyed over, onto, or under wharves or be-
tween vessels (to or from barge, lighter or water), when berthed at wharf or when
moored in slip adjacent to wharf." 46 CFR § 533.6 (d)(2). "Warehouse" is not explicity
defined, but the regulations speak of "covered and/or open storage space, cold storage
plants . . ."
15. State of California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944).
16. Id. at 585.
17. Id. at 585-86.
18. Id. at 586.
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in the same chain of maritime commerce as do wharfage, dockage and
warehousing." 9
Sections 15 through 17 of the Shipping Act of 1916 may be viewed as the
Act's general jurisdictional sections. 0 Section 15 of the Act requires that
agreements originated by ports, as well as terminal agreements made
between vessel operators (or their agents) and the port, be filed with the
Commission. After notice and hearing, the FMC has the power to:
[D]isapprove, cancel or modify any agreement, or cancellation thereof,
whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly
discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters,
importers or ports, or between exporters from the United States and
their foreign competitors, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce
of the United States, or to be contrary to the public interest, or to be in
violation of the Act, and shall approve all other agreements, modifica-
tions or cancellations.2
When assessing terminal agreements, the FMC must take into consid-
eration several factors. First, the Commission must determine if the
arrangement unjustly discriminates between ocean carriers, or falls within
the confines of a terminal agreement. It should be noted that some port
authorities, rather than publishing tariff rates, operate strictly under
terminal agreements. Second, the Commission must ensure that the arrange-
ment does not work to the detriment of the United States. Finally, it must
determine that the agreement does not violate the Shipping Act."
The filing of terminal lease agreements has always been troublesome
both to ports and to the FMC itself. In order to clarify this area, the FMC has
published "guidelines" to aid in the determination of what types of leases,
licenses, assignments, or other contractual relationships are required to be
filed with the FMC.23
Generally, terminal agreements between persons subject to the Act
covering the lease, license, or assignment of terminal facilities must be filed
when they:
(a) fix or regulate rates, rules, regulations, or charges;
(b) give or receive special rates, accommodations, or privileges;
19. Todd Buchwald, "Federal Maritime Commission Jurisdiction Over Terminal
Operators," Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 12, No. 2, January 1981, at
n. 20.
20. See 46 U.S.C. § 814-16.
21. See 46 U.S.C. § 814.
22. See 46 U.S.C. § 815.
23. FMC informal rulemaking as published in 29 Fed. Reg. 5041, April 11, 1964.
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(c) control, regulate, prevent, or destroy competition;
(d) provide for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working
arrangement by agreeing to pool facilities, labor, or resources for
terminal operations; and
(e) provide that earnings or losses received from a marine terminal
operation shall be divided between two or more persons subject to
the Act, except that rental payments based directly upon the
amount of cargo handled will not be considered an apportionment of
earnings.
Terminal agreements need not be filed when they:
(a) are between two persons either of whom is not subject to the Act;
(b) do not include terminal facilities for the handling of cargo or
passengers moving in foreign or interstate ocean commerce;
(c) are not related to terminal facilities which handle, or hold them-
selves out to handle, common carrier vessels in foreign or interstate
ocean commerce;
(d) cover only lease of space to stevedores for offices and/or for storage of
gear, provided that rental for such space is a fixed amount not in
excess of $10,000 annually;
(e) concern routine day-to-day terminal operations involving the tem-
porary assignment of berth, wharf, or pipe line, or the rental of
equipment, when provided for in a tariff or by a license or permit
form which has previously been determined to be not subject to
Section 15;
(f) concern terminal services, the charges for which appear in a tariff
and are available to all applicants on equal terms.24
Agreements filed under Section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916, are not
wholly exempt from antitrust laws. If a Section 15 arrangement violates
antitrust laws, it must either fulfill a transportation necessity that benefits
the public, or further the purpose of the Shipping Act, in order to remain in
effect.2 5 Essentially, free and open competition by independent carriers is
encouraged while conferences (semi-cartels) are permitted subject to regula-
tion.
General Order 15,"6 issued by the FMC, complements Section 15 of the
Shipping Act of 1916 in dealing with port terminal tariff rates.17 The General
24. See § 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916, supra note 1.
25. FMC v. Swedish American Line, 390 U.S. 238 (1968).
26. FMC General Order 15, 46 CFR 533, October 5, 1965.
27. Id.
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Order applies to common carriers by water, marine terminal operators, and
"other persons" to whose practices these rules are directed. The order
requires filing, but not approval, of rates, rules and regulations, and any
changes thereto with the Commission on or before their effective dates."
General Order 15 also requires tariff rates, rules and regulations to be
posted at places of business. 9 It requires that definitions be included in
tariffs30 The essential purpose of General Order 15 is to provide notice to the
Commission and to the public of the current rates and practices of marine
terminal operators. It is hoped that this Order will provide the FMC with
sufficient information to enforce relevant provisions of its enabling legisla-
tion, without unduly burdening ports.
It should be noted that the Commission's power to reject tariffs is limited
to violations of its tariff-filing regulations that prescribe the form or manner
of publishing or filing tariffs. The Commission does not have the authority to
reject tariffs on any basis other than one specified in the Shipping Act." One
recent development is that certain port authorities are publishing tariff/lease
rates for month-to-month rental situations in their terminals - a practice
which is encouraged by the Commission and obviates the necessity for
individual Section 15 approvals.32 In recent months the Commission has
closely examined this entire area and is continuing to explore the possibility
of developing certain additional lease and tariff filing requirements.:
Section 16 of the Shipping Act (the second general jurisdictional section
of the Act), pertains to the prevention of undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage. This section makes it unlawful for a shipper to unjustly obtain or
attempt to obtain transportation by water at prices that would ordinarily be
less than applicable u It also prevents "common carriers" and those subject to
the Act from giving undue preference or advantage to any particular person
or locality or to subject the same to unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage."
Essentially, this section prohibits carriers from discriminating against
particular ports through tariff rates or otherwise.:6
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. FMC, 392 F. Supp. 795, 802 (1975).
32. See Maryland Port Administration Terminal Services Tariff No. 5, Section IX
at 16.
33. See Exemptions from Provisions of Shipping Act, 1916, and Intercoastal Ship-
ping Act, 1933, FMC 79-18 March 28, 1979, (discontinued); Proposed Exemption of
Non-Exclusive Trans-shipment Agreements from Section 15 Approval Requirements
FMC 80-34, July 24, 1980.
34. See 46 U.S.C. § 814.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Section 17 (the Act's final general jurisdictional section) prohibits
common carriers from charging discriminatory rates or rates that would be
discriminatory to American exporters. It further provides that "common
carriers" and "other persons" must observe "treasonable practices" in
connection with the handling of freight.3
B3. GENERAL FMC JURISDICTION OVER VESSELS
In relation to domestic commerce (i.e., waterborne movements between
the coastal states, Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories and possessions), the
Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933,38 and the Shipping Act of 1916'9 confer
upon the FMC plenary rate-making powers. Currently, however, it is the
Interstate Commerce Commission that regulates the majority of interstate
shipping.
In contrast, the FMC's powers over foreign commerce are relatively
restricted. The Commission must approve all ocean carrier agreements,
formed by single carriers joining together in semi-cartels called "confer-
ences", before they become effective. It may alto disapprove unjustly
discriminatory and unreasonably high or low rates under certain sets of
circumstances.4 0 The FMC retains only limited rate-making authority over
foreign carriers, and may not suspend a proposed rate or set a "reasonable
rate," as it can under the Intercoastal Shipping Act." Not only does the
Commission lack the power to set a new rate pending the conclusion of a
hearing, it cannot set a new rate even after determination that a challenged
rate is unreasonably high or low. The Commission may only alter rates "to
the extent necessary to correct . . . unjust discrimination or prejudice"
toward shippers or ports as authorized by Section 17 of the Shipping Act of
1916.1
2
The methods selected by Congress to regulate the shipping industry's
practices are public disclosure and review of all inter-company agreements
and tariff rates, regulations, and practices. 3 The policy underlying the
requirement of public disclosure is to enable a shipper to easily discover his
37. See 46 U.S.C. § 816.
38. See P.L. 415, March 3, 1933.
39. See 46 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. (1970).
40. See 46 U.S.C. 99 814-17. As a general rule, reasonable and nondiscriminatory
rates should be no lower than the cost of service to the carrier plus a reasonable profit
and no higher than the reasonable worth of the service to the shipper. Gulf Westbound
Intercoastal Soyo Beam Oil Meal Rates, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 554 at 560.
41. See P.L. 415, March 3, 1933.
42. See 46 U.S.C. § 816.
43. See 46 U.S.C. § 815.
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rights and obligations vis-a-vis common carriers and ports. Any deviation
from public filings creates civil liability." Modifications and cancellations of
ocean carrier agreements, as well as oral agreements (which must be reduced
to writing)," must be filed with the Commission.
Agreements that are anti-competitive in nature are prohibited by
Sections 14(b) and 15 of the Act,46 unless prior approval is obtained from the
FMC. Even assuming such anti-trust immunity is granted, it is contingent
upon the carrier's compliance with the statutory requirements - including
the disclosure and nondiscrimination provisions found throughout the Act.47
Dual-rate contracts48 and any modifications or cancellations to them, must be
filed with the FMC. Furthermore, third-party carriers that conform to
agreements between other carriers are treated as though they were actually
parties to those agreements.49 Such third-party carriers are therefore subject
to the Shipping Act of 1916."
In 1961, Congress added a public interest standard to Section 15 which
was later upheld by the Supreme Court. In relation to anti-trust, this
standard requires that
[Tihe parties seeking exemption from the anti-trust laws for their
agreement must demonstrate that the agreement is required by a
serious transportation need, or in order to secure important public
benefits. Otherwise it is our view that the public interest in the
44. Violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 14(b), 15, 18(b) is punishable by a civil penalty of
$1,000 per day.
45. Unapproved Section 15 Agreements - South African Trade, 7 FMC 159, 184-
191 (1962).
46. See 46 U.S.C. § 813(a).
47. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 813(a), 814.
48. 46 U.S.C. § 813(a) authorizes "dual rate contracts" that are formal arrange-
ments between shippers and conferences in which the shipper agrees to use exclusively
the services of the conference. In return for this exclusive patronage, the conference
charges rates that are 15% less than the rates charged those who do not sign similar
contracts. If the shipper breaks the contract and ships with some other carriers, he
must pay liquidated damages to the conference.
The dual rate contract must be offered to all shippers. It is not applicable to
bulk commodities except liquids in less than shipload lots. A shipper may withdraw
from a dual rate contract only upon 90 days' notice; a conference may alter or cancel its
entire dual rate system only after giving 90 days' notice. A conference may only raise
or open its rates after 90 days, and if shipper objects to the raise, may give 30 days'
notice of termination conditioned upon the conference's changing rate. The FMC may
cancel such a system upon finding that it is contrary to public policy or detrimental to
the commerce of the United States.
49. See U.S.C. § 814.
50. See 46 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. (1970).
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preservation of competition where possible, even in regulated industries,
is unduly offended . . . Disapproval of an agreement on this is not
grounded on any necessary finding that it violates the anti-trust laws
but rather because the anti-competitive activity under agreement
invades the prohibitions of the anti-trust laws more than is necessary to
serve the purpose of the Shipping Act and is therefore contrary to the
public interest.5
Essentially, this standard is one that weighs public interest against strict
adherence to the Shipping Act in matters of agreement, approval, general
contract rates, and tariffs."
The FMC's general jurisdiction over vessels, as provided in the Shipping
Act, essentially prohibits three types of discriminatory conduct: (1) behavior,
the purpose of which is to injure competing carriers; (2) behavior which
unfairly draws traffic from its natural routing; and (3) conduct that results in
similarly situated shippers being treated differently. Such discriminatory
conduct is prohibited throughout the Shipping Act in several ways. First,
Sections 16 and 17 together make any degree of discrimination against ports,
through tariff rates or otherwise, unlawful. An "unjustly discriminatory" rate
may be corrected by the FMC in order to prevent the discriminationw"
Second, there are several provisions within the Act that prohibit carriers
from differentiating among shippers that operate under similar circum-
stances. Section 14 prohibits unjust discrimination against small shippers
and any practices of carriers that involve "retaliation or resort to other
discriminating or unfair methods (against any shipper) because such shipper
has patronized any other carrier."' This section further prohibits the practice
of awarding rebates to shippers who exclusively ship on conference lines and
the employment of fighter ships to undercut non-conference carriers.; Along
the same lines, Section 16 forbids shippers to procure transportation at less
than published rates in order to gain an advantage over their competitors.
Carriers may not charge a fraudulently contracted rate or give preference to
51. See 46 U.S.C. § 816.
52. It should be noted that the FMC has not limited its enforcement of the estab-
lished public interest standard to anti-trust matters. This weighing process has, for
example, been used in connection with Section 8 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920
and Section 205 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, both of vital concern to ports. See
46 U.S.C. § 867.
53. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 815, 816.
54. See 46 U.S.C. § 812.
55. See 46 U.S.C. § 815.
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or discriminate against particular persons" or shippers. 7 In addition, Section
18(b) prohibits carriers from charging rates other than those published.'
C. THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 1936
The FMC administers Section 205 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,'
51
that regulates the practice of common carriers and was intended to protect
ports. This section makes it unlawful for a common carrier to prevent
another
[Firom serving any port designed for the accommodation of ocean-going
vessels located on any improvement project authorized by the Congress
or through it by any other agency of the Federal Government lying
within the continental limits of the United States, at the same rates
which it charges at the nearest port already regularly served by it.60
The underlying purpose of Section 205 was to prohibit conferences from
imposing restrictions on member lines which would interfere with the free
exercise of the lines' discretion in determining which ports to serve."
The FMC has continually expanded its enforcement regulation of Section
205 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.62 For example, in July 1977, the Far
East Conference (FEC) filed a revised tariff that directed specific port
wharfage charges to be passed on to the owner, shipper, or consignee of the
cargo, instead of being included in ocean tariffs. In June 1978, the FMC
unanimously voted to block the move by the FEC. The FMC held that the
FEC's action to pass on the wharfage charges to the shipper violated the
established shipping and maritime practices inherent in Section 205 of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936.3 These violations were deemed flagrant by the
FMC since Section 205 prohibits a conference from requiring or preventing
different rates from applying at neighboring ports. The FMC stated that
"where the facts indicate that particular activity contravenes Section 205 of
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the Commission applying the public
interest standard of Section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916, has no
alternative but to disapprove such activity."''
56. See 46 U.S.C. § 815.
57. See 46 U.S.C. § 816.
58. See 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(3).
59. See 46 U.S.C. § 1115.
60. See 46 U.S.C. § 1115.
61. See 46 U.S.C. § 1115.
62. Far East Conference Amended Tariff Rule Regarding Assessment of Wharfage
and Other Accessorial Charges, 20 FMC 772 (1978).
63. Id. at 776.
64. Id. at 777.
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D. THE FMC AND THE ASSESSMENT OF CHARGES AT PORTS
"Free time" and "demurrage practices" have always been difficult and
controversial areas for the FMC. "Free time" is defined as that period during
which cargo is permitted to rest on a wharf without charge. In other words,
the allowance of free time establishes a specific amount of time that cargo
may remain on a pier without charge.' Regulation of free time practices falls
under Section 17 of the Shipping Act of 1916, which provides that common
carriers in foreign commerce shall not charge discriminatory or prejudicial
rates to American exporters. Section 17 further provides that carriers must
observe reasonable practices in connection with the handling of freight.
Generally, the length of time that is permissible as free time is that
period which is deemed "reasonably necessary for a shipper to assemble or to
remove his goods and for the ship to load or to discharge."" When cargo is left
on the wharf beyond what is determined to be the reasonable free time, a
penalty or "demurrage charge" is assessed.
The duty to provide free time, in addition to reasonable terminal
facilities, is part of an ocean carrier's responsibility. The determination of a
reasonable time must take into account the rights of all parties involved,
including the rights of carriers, importers, and the public interest.67 The
determination of a reasonable period for free time is reached through a
process of balancing. It has been noted that:
[Tihe best index to the adequacy of free time is evidence relative to the
frequency and amount of demurrage assessments. If demurrage were
assessed with great frequency, or in large amounts, it would suggest
that free time is inadequate for delivery. If, on the other hand,
demurrage is the exception rather than the rule, and the amounts of
demurrage are small, we must infer that cargo is normally deliverable
and delivered within free time and that free time is adequate.'
When the Commission determines that various practices are unjust or
unreasonable, a cease and desist order may be issued.
There are certain limitations on the allowance of free time. First, the
period allowed for free time is strictly limited to that amount of time required
for a shipper to assemble, or for a consignee to remove his cargo.69 Second, a
65. See 46 U.S.C. § 816 and FMC General Order 15, 46 CFR 533, October 5, 1965.
66. State of California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 at 580 (1944).
67. Free Time and Demurrage Charges at New York, 3 USMC 89, 93 (1948).
68. Id. at 101.
69. Id. at 93.
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carrier has no obligation to provide a shipper with any time beyond that
which is reasonable and necessary for assemblage or pick-up. 0
In 1976, the FMC issued a "circular letter" to all marine terminal
operators, the purpose of which was to survey free time practices on an
informal basis. The letter was necessitated by the many complaints the
Commission had received concerning the excessive amount of free time being
allowed by various ports and terminal operators. In this letter, the FMC
requested "all ports and terminals who have tariffs on file with this
Commission to review their tariffs and where a terminal or port is allowing
free time in excess of 15 days, that immediate consideration be given to
adjusting such free time periods not to exceed 15 days" (emphasis supplied)."
The Commission also requested that those ports and terminals whose free
time provisions exceed 15 days give notification and rationale for such
practice. The Commission warned that failure to respond to its request could
result in the institution of formal action by the Commission to determine the
justification and reasonableness of free time practices. The response to this
informal request was minimal, however, there was no further action taken by
the FMC.
Several ports have created special free time and demurrage provisions in
their tariffs. For example, one terminal tariff in the Port of New York states
that "on project cargo an assembly period, not to exceed forty-five (45)
consecutive calendar days, may be granted for consignments of cargo being
assembled for shipments in large lots . ..Such assembly time shall be
granted at the discretion of the management of the marine terminal."72 The
Port of Hampton Roads (Virginia) has a similar provision in its terminal
tariff.3
Wharfage charges are assessments that are made by a pier owner or
operator against shippers or consignees for the use of a wharf and for the
moving of freight between a ship and its place of rest on the wharf.74 This
charge is levied upon every pound of cargo that is loaded or off-loaded from a
vessel for the account of the vessel or shipper .71 Wharfage rates are based
upon the type of commodity that is being moved. These charges are
70. Assembly Time - Port of San Diego, 13 FMC 1, 11 (1969).
71. FMC Circular Letter No. 5-76-T, Excessive Free Time.
72. New York Terminal Conference Tariff, FMC - T No. 16, effective December
11, 1978.
73. Port of Hampton Roads, Terminal Tariff No. 1, effective October 1, 1979.
74. Terminal Rates and Charges at Seattle of Alaska S.S. Co., 2 CFR 533, October
5, 1965.
75. FMC General Order 15, 46 CFR 533, October 5, 1965.
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transportation rates within the meaning of Section 15 of the Shipping Act"
and must be published in a tariff."
Dockage is the charge assessed by a pier owner or operator for the
furnishing of berthing facilities. 8 More specifically, this charge is assessed
against a vessel for the use of berthing space at a wharf or alongside other
vessels at a wharf. This charge is for the space occupied by the vessel and
has no direct relation to service rendered." Dockage charges fall within
Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act of 1916.1
The impact of the Shipping Acts on vessels and ports can best be gauged
by their flexibility and the record of port growth since 1916. From an era of
wooden freight piers owned by railroads or ocean carriers, we have witnessed
the development of a port industry with sophisticated equipment and
technological innovations estimated to be worth $40.4 billion. 2 One could
safely state that if the federal regulatory scheme over ports did not foster
their growth, it certainly did not stifle it.
III. MISCELLANEOUS AGENCIES AND PORTS
In addition to the FMC and the various Shipping Acts, six federal
agencies also regulate the daily functioning of American ports.
A. THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been charged by Congress with a
major federal role in water resources development that encompasses both
ocean ports and inland waterways."2 Although the Corps of Engineers was
initially delegated the broad responsibility of public works, it currently deals
with many issues arising from technological and environmental changes. The
setting of federal and state standards for the disposal of dredged spoils has
altered the Corps' traditional role in the area of port responsibility.
The dredging operations of the Corps of Engineers have been a major
factor in the development of the U.S. port industry. The Federal Water
76. See 46 U.S.C. § 814.
77. Agreement No. 8905 - Port of Seattle and Alaska S.S. Co., 7 FMC 792 (1964)
at 797.
78. Contract Rates - Port of Redwood City, 2 USMC 727 at 743.
79. Terminal Rate Increases - Puget Sound Ports, 3 USMC 21 at 25.
80. Id.
81. West Gulf Maritime Assn. v. Port of Houston Authority, et al., No. 74-15,
September 26, 1979.
82. U.S. Maritime Administration, The National Port Assessment, 1980-1990,
issues July 1980.
83. See 33 U.S.C. §1284.
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Pollution Control Act," as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977 (Sections
403(c) and 404(b)),5 the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972,1 the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,8 7 and various other
federal laws have charged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in
coordination with the Secretary of the Army, to develop regulations to control
dredging and filling activities in inland waters of the United States and
adjacent wetlands, and the disposal of dredged material in ocean waters.
These regulations require evaluation and assessment of the probable impact
dredging and filling operations will have on the marine environment,
wildlife, habitats, and the overall environment, including the probable
impact on the well-being of man. They are applicable not only to projects of
the Corps of Engineers, but to other projects in the public and private sectors
as well.'
B. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA)
As stated above, the EPA has a direct impact on the daily operations of
the ports of the United States. Through the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA), 9 the EPA directs all agencies of the federal government
to employ a "systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will ensure the
integrated use of the material and social sciences and the environmental
design arts in planning and decision-making which may have an impact on
man's environment."' 0 More specifically, Section 102(2) of the Act requires all
agencies to include in their recommendations affecting the environment a
detailed statement including:
(1) the environmental impact;
(2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented;
(3) alternatives to the proposed action;
(4) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity;
and
84. See P.L. 92-500; 86 Stat. 816, October 18, 1972.
85. Clean Air Act of 1977; P.L. 95-95; 91 Stat. 685, August 7, 1977.
86. See P.L. 92-532, October 23, 1972.
87. See P.L. 91-190; 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; 83 Stat. 852, January 1, 1970.
88. "Current Dredging Concerns of the American Association of Port Authorities,"
Remarks by Herbert R. Haar, Jr., Annual Meeting of the North Atlantic Port Associa-
tion, Inc., December 6, 1979.
89. See P.L. 91-190; 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; 83 Stat. 852, January 1, 1970.
90. Id.
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(5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.9 '
In May 1980, the FMC issued General Order 45. In this General Order,
final procedural rules were enacted to implement NEPA in compliance with
the regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality. These procedures
were made applicable to all Commission actions except those requiring
environmental analysis. 2
C. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION
The Maritime Administration (MARAD) falls under the auspices of the
Department of Commerce and is charged with the responsibility of promoting
and developing federal policies and goals regarding ocean ports. 3 The central
role of MARAD is the administration of the merchant marine subsidy
program. This program provides for the construction and operation of
differential subsidies to the U.S. Merchant Marine. It is also responsible for
the promotion and development of waterborne transportation for the
domestic and foreign commerce of the United States.4
The specific functions of MARAD are administrative and developmental
in nature. They include:
(1) the administration of maritime laws pertaining to construction-
differential and operating-differential subsidies to the American
merchant marine;"
(2) maintaining national defense reserve fleets or government-owned
merchant ships;'
(3) determining ocean services necessary for the development and
maintenance of U.S. foreign commerce;'
(4) the investigation of foreign and U.S. vessel construction and
operating costs; and
(5) the training of merchant marine officers."
91. FMC General Order 45; 46 CFR 547, May 21, 1980.
92. Id. See also, 45 Fed. Reg. 163, August 20, 1980.
93. See Re-organization Plan 7 of 1961; 75 Stat. 840 as amended by P.L. 91-469,
84 Stat. 1036.
94. Marcus, supra note 1 at 126.
95. See 46 U.S.C. § 867.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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Section 8 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920" provides that it is part of
MARAD's duty to function as a formal organizational component of port
development. Among some of its duties in this area are the formulation and
execution of programs to promote integrated transportation systems, the
development of plans for coordinated efforts among agencies of the federal
government, and the conduct of emergency preparation plans for ports and
port facilities under national mobilization conditions." ° In 1969, the Office of
Ports and Intermodal Systems was created in order to expand these sorts of
activities. 0
It should be noted that the FMC and MARAD are currently different
agencies, although prior to 1961 they were a single entity. MARAD has the
responsibility of developing, promoting, and assisting the daily functioning of
ports. The FMC, on the other hand, functions as a regulatory and policing
agency.
D. THE U.S. COAST GUARD
The primary duties and responsibilities of the Coast Guard are set forth
in Title 14 of the United States Code.
The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all
applicable federal laws on or under the high seas and waters subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States; shall administer laws and
promulgate and enforce regulations for the promotion of safety of life
and property on and under the high seas and waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States covering all matters not specifically
delegated by law to some other executive department; shall develop,
establish, maintain, and operate, with due regard to the requirements of
a national defense, aids to maritime navigation, icebreaking facilities,
and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, under, and over the
high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;
shall engage in oceanographic research of the high seas and in waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and shall maintain a
state of readiness or function as a specialized service in the Navy in
time of war.0
99. See 46 U.S.C. § 867.
100. Marcus, supra note 1 at 130-32.
101. See 14 U.S.C. § 2.
102. 63 Stat. 496, Ch. 393, August 4, 1969; P.L. 87-396, 75 Stat. 827, sec. 1, Octo-
ber 5, 1961; P.L. 91-278, 84 Stat. 304, sec. 1(1), June 12, 1970.
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The Coast Guard has always had a major role in the operation of U.S.
ports and harbors. Legislative enactments of recent years have altered and
expanded the Guard's responsibilities. 0 Especially important is the Guard's
role in domestic port development, which requires the agency to enforce
regulations and standards pertaining to the safety of port and vessel
operations, the safe transport of dangerous or hazardous cargoes, the control
and abatement of marine pollution, and a number of other maritime
regulatory tasks."l° The Port and Waterways Safety Act of 1970105 emphasizes
this responsibility of the Coast Guard. It provides that it is the duty of the
agency to "promote safe and efficient maritime transportation and to promote
the safety environmental quality of the ports, harbors, and navigable waters
of the United States."'0
E. THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Since its creation in 1966, the Department of Transportation (DOT) has
not been directly involved in maritime activities. In recent years, DOT has
displayed an interest in this area, but Congress has confined its role to the
provisions of the Deep Water Port Act of 1974.07 The Secretary of DOT was
charged under the Act with the overall licensing authority for the develop-
ment of super-port terminal facilities."° The Coast Guard, in turn, was
assigned the task of regulating the operation of these facilities. The major
provisions of the Act are as follows:
(1) DOT is given licensing authority for the development and operation
of deepwater port facilities;
(2) Coastal states bordering the proposed development of a deepwater
port have the power to veto such proposals;
(3) A timetable for administrative action is established;
103. Institutional changes in the traditional port development scenario have engen-
dered new policy challenges and different administrative roles for the Coast
Guard in its port and harbor affairs. New environmental legislation has added
many policy and program responsibilities to traditional Coast Guard operations,
while advances in maritime technology have placed administrative pressures on
many traditional regulatory duties as well as requiring new policy approaches.
Marcus, supra note 1 at 139.
104. Port and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 46 U.S.C. § 391a.
105. Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1970: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Coast Guard, Coast & Geodetic Survey & Navigation on H.R. 17830, 92d CONG., 1ST
SESS. (July 24, 30; August 10,11; September 15, 16, 26, 1970).
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107. See 33 U.S.C. § 1501.
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(4) A criteria for environmental review for the evaluation of applica-
tions for construction of deepwater port facilities is established;
(5) Anti-trust review of facility applications is provided for in Section 7
of the Act;
(6) DOT is authorized by the Act to establish navigable safety
regulations and to designate safety zones with permissible uses; and
(7) DOT is authorized to make a comparison of economic benefits
arising from dredging an onshore deepwater port with the economic
benefits of an offshore terminal facility.'
F. TE NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1974110 established a "national
policy providing for the management, beneficial use, protection, and develop-
ment of the land and water resources of the nation's coastal zones, and for
other purposes."'' The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration (NOAA) was established to administer the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1974. Its key functions are to:
(1) Provide incentives to states to develop management programs;
(2) Facilitate the harmonization of local and state programs with
national objectives;
(3) Function as a clearinghouse for technical information relating to
coastal zones; and
(4) Assist state programs by suggesting aids for evaluating the best
economic and social use of coastal zones."
2
NOAA has the authority to grant money to individual states for programs
aimed at developing coastal zone programs."' To those coastal states with
approved plans, NOAA may make annual grants. 4
IV CONCLUSION
From a legal viewpoint, the FMC is currently an anomaly among federal
regulatory agencies. During the five-year period from 1976-80, the trend
among federal agencies was one of deregulation. The Interstate Commerce
109. Marcus, supra note 1 at 190-91.
110. See, 16 U.S.C. § 1451.
111. Marcus, supra note 1 at 63.
112. Marcus, supra note 1 at 63-64.
113. Marcus, supra note 1 at 64.
114. Id.
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Commission, for example, drastically reduced federal regulation in the areas
of motor carrier and rail transportation through the enactment of legislation
and decreased rulemaking. Similarly, the Civil Aeronautics Board fully
deregulated commercial airlines and partially deregulated routes of entry.
The FMC, however, has continued to increase and redefine its regulatory
arsenal "I rather than deregulate any sector of its jurisdiction.
The fact that the FMC has resisted the trend toward deregulation can be
attributed in large part to the nature of the parties it controls. As has been
seen, the FMC controls U.S. and foreign flag carriers in addition to
competitive U.S. ports. The extensive framework which establishes the
concurrent foreign and U.S. jurisdiction of the FMC is one that cannot easily
have portions dismantled without causing the total destruction of the
framework. Perhaps it is for this reason that Congress has, thus far, not
attempted to legislatively deregulate the FMC.
What will the 1980's bring for the FMC? The Heritage Foundation
Report1 6 has offered three scenarios depicting the possible future of the FMC:
(1) A complete re-organization of the Commission by transferring its
functions to the U.S. Departments of Commerce and Transportation;
(2) The appointment of a Republican commissioner who would under-
take the process of deregulation within the present structure of the
FMC; or
(3) The abolition of the FMC."7
To date, it appears that the Reagan Administration will not abolish or
even de-emphasize the role of the FMC. Rather, the Administration has
partially adopted the course contained in the Heritage Foundation's second
option."8 The full implementation of this option has not been followed to date,
although Republican Richard J. Daschbach has been appointed as FMC
Chairman by the Reagan Administration.
It is the authors' opinion that this decade will see little alteration in
FMC regulatory authority or procedure. From time to time, one may expect
refinement or a gradual lessening of the regulatory stronghold over common
115. See Controlled Carrier Act, P.L. 95-483, 92 Stat. 1607, effective November 18,
1978; FMC General Order 45, 46 CFR 547, May 20, 1980; Japan/Korea - Atlantic and
Gulf Freight Rules Pertaining to Chassie Availability and Demurrage Charges that
result when chassis are not available, FMC Docket No. 79-86 (1980).
116. The Heritage Foundation - Transportation 2000, January - February 1981,
50-52.
117. Id. at 50.
118. Journal of Commerce, March 5-6, 1981.
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carriers and ports. In final analysis, however, it is likely that these entities
will continue to be regulated - as they have been for 65 years - under one
of the most archaic statutory and regulatory frameworks that has existed in
American legislative history.
